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INTROOUCTION 
Martin Guzman, Jose Antonio Ocampo, and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
Sovereign debt crises are becoming, once again, frequent. In some cases, 
the costs to the citizens of those countries facing such crises have been 
enormous. Deficiencies in the mechanisms for resolving such crises cast a 
pallor over countries that are not yet in a crisis but worry that they might 
become so; and indeed, the high costs and uncertainties associated with 
debt restructuring dampen cross-border capital flows and force especially 
developing countries and emerging markets to pay higher interest rates 
than might be the case if there were better ways of resolving these debt 
problems. 
A fresh start for distressed debtors is a basic principle of a well-
functioning market economy. The absence of a fresh start may lead to 
large inefficiencies, wherein both the debtor and the creditors lose. This 
principle is well recognized in domestic bankruptcy laws. But there is 
no international bankruptcy framework that similarly governs sovereign 
debts. We refer to such a broad framework as a "framework for sovereign 
debt restructuring." 
This lacuna is creating serious problems for nations facing sovereign 
debt crises. The issue has been brought to the fore especially by the dif-
ficulties recently faced by several countries attempting reasonable debt 
restructurings-most notably Argentina and Greece. 
Sovereign debt restructuring has suffered from "too little, too late." The 
current system discourages incumbent governments from initiating debt 
restructurings. And when a restructuring is undertaken, it is often not deep 
enough to provide the conditions for an economic recovery, as the Greek 
debt restructuring of 2012 illustrates. And if the debtor decides to play 
hardball and not accept the terms demanded by the creditors, finalizing a 
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restructuring can take a long time and, as the case of Argentina illustrates, 
be beset with legal challenges, especially from small groups of noncoopera-
tive agents (holdout creditors) that have earned the epithet "vulture funds." 
Under the current non-system, the gaps in the international legal architec-
ture make possible the emergence of these vulture funds, who buy defaulted 
debt in secondary markets at very low prices and then litigate against the 
issuer for the payment of the full amount of the liabilities. This destabiliz-
ing speculative behavior, together with the favorable treatment these agents 
have been receiving from the U.S. courts, creates serious problems, as it 
encourages all creditors to hold out in debt restructuring negotiations-
making debt restructurings de facto impossible. 
Delays in debt restructurings have been costly for sovereigns and for 
good faith investors. These dysfunctions have ramifications for the entire 
sovereign debt market. They may lead to a reluctance on the part of coun-
tries to borrow, even when doing so might make sense; and they may lead 
to higher interest rates in sovereign debt markets. 
These problems are not new. They have been plaguing the functioning 
of sovereign debt markets for decades. Over the past fifreen years discus-
sions have explored many alternative ways of dealing with both situations 
in which sovereigns have difficulties in meeting their debt obligations and 
the subsequent economic, political, and social consequences. Each has to 
be evaluated in terms of ex ante incentives. Is there, in some sense, too 
much or too little lending? How is lending distributed across countries? 
Is lending done on the right terms? To the right countries? Do the lenders 
have the right incentives for due diligence? And do the borrowers have 
the incentives for prudent borrowing? 
An assessment of alternative frameworks for resolving sovereign debt 
crises must also consider the ex post incentives: When a problem occurs, 
are there incentives for a timely resolution? Are there incentives for a fair 
and efficient resolution, one that enables the indebted country to return 
to growth quickly, that does not impose undue hardship on the debtor's 
citizens, and provides fair compensation to the creditors? Does it provide 
appropriate treatment for "implicit" creditors, such as old-age pensioners? 
Some have suggested that simple modifications of the current contrac-
tual approach are all that are required. Others claim that some sovereign 
debt restructuring mechanism would be desirable; this is known as the 
"statutory approach." Others aver that at the very least, there is a need for 
an international agreement on the set of acceptable debt contracts-for 
instance, that countries cannot sign away their sovereign immunities. 
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At the time of publication of this book, the issue of fixing the frame-
works for sovereign debt restructuring is in the center of the global 
debate. It has been explicitly addressed by the United Nations (in reso-
lutions overwhelmingly passed by the General Assembly in September 
2or4 and in September 2015 over the opposition of some developed 
countries and the abstention of others), the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
G2o, which made explicit reference to the need of resolving the cur-
rent deficiencies in the final communique of the leaders' summit in 
November 201+ 
There have been several important academic studies addressing various 
aspects of frameworks for sovereign debt restructuring and the advantages 
and disadvantages of these mechanisms relative to the private contractual 
approach. In light of the recent events and progress in our understanding 
of the issues, these studies need to be updated. 
This book fills in this gap by providing a collection of essays from 
top academic economists, lawyers, and practitioners in the field, provid-
ing guidance on the most critical questions.· (Many of these ideas were 
presented as part of an ongoing series of conferences held at Columbia 
University on frameworks for sovereign debt restructuring.) 
Part I focuses on general issues of sovereign debt restructuring, with an 
emphasis on the goals of debt restructuring and the challenges imposed 
by the deficiencies in the current non-system, as well as the implications 
of recent events for the functioning of sovereign lending markets. 
In chapter l, Martin Guzman and Joseph E. Stiglitz review the exist-
ing problems in the world of sovereign debt restructuring, contrast how 
well existing structures and proposed alternatives fulfill the objectives 
of debt restructuring, and propose solutions. They argue that improve-
ments in the language of contracts, although beneficial, cannot provide a 
comprehensive, efficient, and equitable solution to the problems faced in 
restructurings, but they note there are improvements within the contrac-
tual approach that should be implemented. They claim that ultimately 
the contractual approach must be complemented by a multinational legal 
framework that facilitates restructurings based on principles of efficiency 
and equity. Given the current geopolitical constraints, in the short run 
they advocate for the implementation of a "soft law" approach, one built 
on the recognition of the limitations of the private contractual approach 
and on a set of principles over which there may be consensus, as the res-
toration of sovereign immunity. 
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In chapter 2, Marilou Uy and Shichao Zhou provide an overview of 
the broadly favorable public debt trends in developing countries over the 
past decade. They also note that while the increased access to interna-
tional debt markets provides more opportunities for investments that 
stimulate growth, it may also bring with it new sources of risk that could 
seriously affect some sovereign borrowers. They also highlight the unique 
challenges that some groups of countries face in managing sustainable 
levels of debt. Their paper further acknowledges countries' responsibility 
for managing their debt but also recognizes that the global community 
has a role in strengthening the system of sovereign debt resolution. Yet 
a global consensus on how to move forward on this has been elusive. In 
this context, their chapter documents the evolution of highly divergent 
views on how to reform the global system for sovereign debt in intergov-
ernmental forums and the potential approaches that could pave the way 
for a wider consensus. 
In chapter 3, Skylar Brooks and Domenico Lombardi examine two 
cases that help to explain why an international framework to facilitate 
sovereign debt restructuring has not been created yet: first, the IMF's 
attempt to establish a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) 
in 2001-2003; second, the creation of the European stability mechanism 
(ESM) in 2012. In the former case, they ask why the SDRM failed despite 
growing recognition of the need for such a mechanism. In the latter case, 
they analyze why eurozone countries responded to the European debt cri-
sis by creating the ESM-a sovereign bailout rather than a debt restruc-
turing mechanism. They argue that private creditor opposition best 
explains the failure to create a sovereign debt restructuring framework 
and advance the hypothesis that private creditor preferences shape out-
comes through two distinct but intersecting forms of power: instrumental 
and structural. Instrumentally, private creditors engage in lobbying and 
"strategic reform" to preempt more far-reaching measures. Structurally, 
private creditor preferences are internalized by states with systemically 
important financial markets and states that rely on international markets 
for their borrowing. 
Part II offers an analysis of two recent major cases-the resolution of 
Argentina's and Greece's debt crises. These cases illustrate the problems 
that the lack of mechanisms for sovereign debt restructuring may create. 
In chapter 4, Sergio Chodos explores in depth Argentina's debt restruc-
turing saga after its 2001 default. In his ruling in the country's dispute 
with vulture funds, Judge Thomas Griesa of the District of New York 
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decided that Argentina breached a boilerplate pari passu clause included 
in sovereign bond issuances, and he created a novel "equitable rem-
edy" that in effect prohibited Argentina from continuing to service its 
restructured debt until the vulture funds had been paid in advance in 
full. This decision, which was confirmed by the Court of Appeals of 
the Second Circuit in October 2012, became operational after the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied a petition for review in June 201+ The chapter 
describes the details of the case and argues that the decision constituted a 
game changer that affected the nature of restructurings to a point where 
the problems generated by the absence of a fair, effective, and efficient 
mechanism to deal with sovereign debt restructuring can no longer be 
neglected. Chodos also argues that one of the main consequences of such 
decision is to render untenable the marked-based approach for sovereign 
debt restructuring. 
In chapter 5, Yarris Varoufakis presents the proposals from the Greek 
government during his appointment as Finance Minister of Tsipras's 
government. He argues that his ministry's priority was an ex-ante debt 
restructuring, because it would provide the "optimism shock'' necessary 
to energize investment in Greece's private sector. He claims that in con-
trast, the troika program they inherited was always going to fail, because 
its logic was deeply flawed and, for this reason, guaranteed to deter invest-
ment. It was a logic based on incoherent backward induction, reflecting 
political expediency's triumph over sound macroeconomic thinking. 
The case of Greek debt is fascinating because it is one of those curi-
ous situations in which creditors extend new loans under conditions that 
guarantee they will not get their money back. Why do Greece's creditors 
refuse to move on debt restructuring before any new loans are negotiated? 
And why did they ignore the Greek government's proposals? What is the 
reason for preferring a much larger new loan package than necessary? 
Varoufakis claims that the answers to these questions cannot be found by 
discussing sound finance, public or private, for they reside firmly in the 
realm of power politics. IfTsipras's government were to conclude a viable, 
mutually advantageous agreement with the troika of creditors, after hav-
ing opposed its "program," its "success" would have seriously jeopardized 
the electoral prospects of troika-friendly governing parties in Portugal, 
Spain, and Ireland. But although these considerations were important 
factors in the perpetuation of the "Greek debt denial," he claims there is 
a more powerful explanation buried deep in the architectural faults of the 
eurozone and in the manner in which a significant European politician, 
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the German finance minister Wolfgang Schauble, (r) understands these 
faults and (2) is planning to resolve them. 
He concludes that behind the Eurogroup rhetoric and decisions a war 
is waging between Berlin and Paris over the form of political union that 
must be introduced to bolster Europe's monetary union. Greek debt will 
not be restructured until this conflict is resolved. 
Part III focuses on a set of possible improvements within the contrac-
tual approach, extending the set of measures proposed by Guzman and 
Stiglitz in chapter r. 
In chapter 6, Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller, and Brad Setser provide 
a comprehensive description of the recent reforms proposed by the 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA) for sovereign debt con-
tracts (a process in which the three experts have been involved), i.e. the 
changes that would allow a supermajority of creditors to approve a debt-
or's restructuring proposal in one vote across multiple bond series. They 
start by reviewing the introduction of series-by-series voting to amend 
financial terms into New York-law bonds in 2003. Then, they look at the 
factors that helped create broad consensus on the need to move beyond 
series-by-series voting in 2012. Most of the essay is devoted to analyz-
ing the key features of the new generation of aggregated CACs and the 
considerations that shaped decisions about these features. They conclude 
with observations on contract reform in sovereign debt restructuring and 
their views of the challenges ahead. 
In chapter 7, Richard Gitlin and Brett House lay out a work pro-
gram to reduce the ex ante costs of sovereign debt restructuring that is 
complemented by additional measures to mitigate the costs of restruc-
turing. Among other measures, they propose the creation of a sovereign 
debt forum that would provide a standing, independent venue (outside of 
existing institutions like the IMF) in which creditors and debtors could 
meet on an ongoing basis to address incipient sovereign debt distress 
in a proactive fashion, and they suggest the implementation of state-
contingent debt in the form of sovereign "cocos," which consists of bonds 
that automatically extend their maturity upon realization of a prespecified 
trigger linked to a liquidity crisis. 
In chapter 8, James Haley makes three points regarding recent 
improvements for sovereign debt contracts suggested by the ICMA and 
later endorsed by the IMF. First, he argues that the new clauses are a use-
ful and potentially important instrument to deal with the problem of 
holdout creditors. Second, he claims the new clauses are not a panacea. 
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This assessment reflects the fact that it will take some time for these 
clauses to be embedded in the stock of outstanding bonds and that what-
ever their merits the new clauses do not fully address the issues of unen-
forceability and discharge of sovereign debts. Third, he notes that the 
debate between voluntary/ contractual and statutory approaches is a false 
dichotomy. Contractual approaches will necessarily be incomplete and 
the design of "institutions," whether bankruptcy provisions embodied in 
formal treaty or the responses of existing international financial institu-
tions, will influence the outcome of sovereign debt restructurings. 
In chapter 9, Timothy DeSieno points to the importance of creditor 
committees for achieving successful sovereign debt restructurings. He 
claims that a more widespread utilization of creditor committees would 
minimize the holdout problems and facilitate inter-creditor consensus, as 
most creditors will usually feel they can trust "a group of their own" more 
readily than they can trust the issuer. 
Part IV turns to the specific proposals for the implementation of a 
multinational formal framework for sovereign debt restructuring. The 
chapters in this section lay out a set of principles, elements, and forms for 
institutionalizing such a framework. 
In chapter ro, Jose Antonio Ocampo provides a history of debt cri-
ses resolution and the rise of the current non-system, which mixes the 
Paris Club for official debts, voluntary renegotiations with private credi-
tors, and occasional ad hoc debt relief initiatives (the Brady Plan and 
the Highly Indebted Po.or Countries and later Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiatives). This system, he argues, not only provides inadequate solu-
tions bur also does not guarantee equitable treatment of different debt-
ors or different creditors. He then proposes a multilateral mechanism for 
sovereign debt restructuring that offers a sequence of voluntary negotia-
tions, mediation, and eventual arbitration with preestablished deadlines, 
similar in a sense to the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
In chapter n, Barry Herman proposes that the UN General Assembly 
should formulate a set of principles to guide governments and interna-
tional institution creditors when restructuring sovereign debt and as the 
representative of the international community should guide the IMF in 
assessing restructuring needs. The principles would also guide national 
courts, which would oversee restructuring of sovereign bonds and bank 
loans issued under national law. The UN Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) would prepare a model law for national 
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governments that would provide common guidance across jurisdictions 
for court supervision of restructuring of private claims. While sovereigns 
would continue to negotiate restructurings separately with each class of 
creditors, the indebted government or creditor groups could appeal the 
workout to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague when 
either party believes there has been a violation of the principles. 
In chapter 12, Jiirgen Kaiser discusses the "institutionalization" of a 
multinational framework for sovereign debt restructuring. In Kaiser's 
view, the institutionalization should comply to three basic principles: 
first, it needs to restructure debt in a single comprehensive process, 
with no payment obligations being exempted from the process; second, 
it needs to allow for impartial decision making about the terms of any 
debt restructuring; and third, this decision must be based on an impartial 
assessment of the debtor's situation. Kaiser claims that. there are not many 
historical precedents for a sovereign debt restructuring that complies with 
these conditions, but the case of Indonesia in 1969 may be inspiring. He 
argues that a "sovereign debt restructuring liaison office" mandated by 
the United Nations and run independently from any debtor or creditor 
interference could be a catalytic element with the potential to overcome 
the shortcomings of existing procedures. In this view, it could facili-
tate a comprehensive negotiation format with all stakeholders around 
the table; it could provide an impartial and thus realistic assessment of 
the need for debt relief; and it could suggest an unbiased solution. Such 
an "office" could be established immediately as an outcome of the present 
UN General Assembly consultation process and then develop its rules, 
regulations, and infrastructure over time. 
In chapter 13, Richard Conn argues that the creation of an agreed-
upon framework that interacts with private party contracts or restricts 
contractual options ex ante is a logical alternative to the status quo. This 
approach can provide greater stability and efficiency in the restructuring 
proc,ss while allowing for sufficient flexibility and certainty for market 
participants. He claims that there are procedural frameworks that could 
add value to the restructuring process with less risk of treading on the 
political terrain of sovereigns. This chapter discusses the catalyst for 
recent efforts to create a framework and context for evaluating sovereign 
debt restructuring; outlines a strategy to successfully adopt a framework 
that deals with problems that require resolution; highlights the deficien-
cies of relying solely upon private party contractual revisions; discusses 
practical impediments to a substantive-law approach to sovereign debt 
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restructuring; and finally puts forward specific proposals for a consensual, 
procedural framework designed to earn broad political support. 
In chapter 14, Robert Howse analyzes some of the possible elements 
of an international-law approach to a multilateral framework for sover-
eign debt restructuring. This chapter draws extensively from the delibera-
tions and publications of the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) Working Group. He proposes the creation of a "counter-
framework" using soft-law instruments of a kind generated by various UN 
processes and institutions, including the International Law Commission, 
UNCITRAL, and UNCTAD. The "counter-framework" would offer 
different norms, fora, legal mechanisms, expertise, and analyses to those 
that dominate the existing informal framework (IMF, Paris Club, U.S. 
Treasury, financial industry associations, private law firms, creditors' 
groups, etc.). It would offer alternatives for borrower-lender relation-
ships and the restructuring of debt, alternatives that if the analysis in this 
chapter (and the other chapters of this book) is correct, would benefit 
both sovereign debtors and creditors. This proposal might be of particular 
interest to states that could be sources of new finance and do not want to 
keep within the existing informal framework (like perhaps China). 
In chapter 15, Kunibert Raffer analyzes which elements are indispens-
able for any model to be rightly called insolvency: equality of parties 
instead of creditor diktat, debtor protection, fairness, and a solution in 
the best interest of all creditors. This chapter presents a model that fulfills 
all these requirements. It concludes by showing that since the 1980s there 
has been progress in moving toward such a model, although at snail speed. 
Overall, the chapters in this book depict an overwhelming consensus 
among those who are well informed about sovereign debt markets but 
do not have a vested interest on either the creditor or debtor side on 
the need to reform the non-system that governs sovereign debt restruc-
turing. Doing so requires the political willingness from both of debtor 
and creditor countries. Debtor countries have raised their voice at the 
United Nations, calling for an end to the suffering that debt crises bring 
under the current arrangements. But creditor countries, led by the United 
States, are reluctant to engage in reforms. The political reasons are clear: 
the reforms would lead to a redefinition of the balance of power berween 
debtors and creditors-a redefinition that is necessary if we are to create 
a better-functioning sovereign debt market. But as this book explains, 
those concerns miss the point. A better system for debt restructuring may 
be a win-win, that is, a situation in which everyone-with the exception 
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of the vulture funds-wins. The size of the pie distributed among debt-
ors and creditors would be larger with a better system. The suffering of 
societies in debt crises would be lessened, and creditors would also benefit 
from the faster economic recoveries that better resolutions of debt crises 
would entail. And as this book emphasizes, if there is a better framework 
for debt restructuring, debt markets will function better. 
